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INTRODUCTION
In vitro fertilization (IVF) has become increasingly popular since the
first “test tube baby” was born more than thirty years ago.1 As people are
*
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1. Susan Donaldson James, Test Tube Baby Louise Brown Turns 35, ABC NEWS (July 25, 2013),
http://abcnews.go.com/Health/test-tube-baby-louise-brown-turns-35-medical/story?id=19764283
[https://perma.cc/4YBX-HSNC].
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delaying childbirth in favor of other pursuits, couples often turn to the
harvesting and freezing of eggs, sperm, and embryos2 to achieve these
goals.3 Since 2007, the American birth rate has been declining steadily.4
Despite this decline, the births of babies conceived using IVF has been
increasing; in 2015, IVF accounted for about 1.6% of all babies born in
the United States.5 This is quite a feat, as the process of harvesting,
fertilizing, and storing eggs or embryos is expensive and invasive.6 “In an
in vitro fertilization procedure, eggs are collected from the woman’s
ovaries and mixed with the man’s sperm outside the body, usually in a
glass dish in a laboratory. . . . The fertilized eggs are then cultivated for a
few days in the laboratory and transferred to the woman’s uterus.”7 “As an
alternative to immediate implantation, pre-zygotes may be cryopreserved
indefinitely in liquid nitrogen for later use.”8 However, many disputes
have arisen9 when a couple creates embryos and stores them but later
divorces. What happens to the frozen embryos?
This issue is further complicated when instead of having both a man
and a woman contribute their genetic material to create an embryo, only
one spouse contributes genetic material and a donor provides the
additional eggs or sperm. The analysis changes from a “dual-progenitor”
dispute, where both parties to the litigation have contributed genetic
material, to a “sole-progenitor” dispute, where only one of the parties to
the litigation has contributed genetic material.

2. There are biological developmental differences between an embryo, a pre-embryo, a
pre-zygote, etc.; however, for the sake of simplicity, this Note will only use the term “embryo”. See
generally Carl H. Coleman, Procreative Liberty and Contemporaneous Choice: An Inalienable Rights
Approach to Frozen Embryo Disputes, 84 MINN. L. REV. 55, 127 n.1 (1999).
3. See Jen Christensen, Record Number of Women Using IVF to Get Pregnant, CNN
(Feb. 18, 2014, 2:36 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/02/17/health/record-ivf-use/ [https://perma.cc/
4YBX-HSNC].
4. Id.
5. See ART Success Rates, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/art/artdata/ [https://perma.cc/GV7V-T6CH]; see also Christensen, supra note 3.
6. See Christensen, supra note 3. The average cost of one IVF treatment in the United States is
$12,400. Id.
7. What is IVF?, CTR. FOR HUM. REPROD., https://www.centerforhumanreprod.com/services/
infertility-treatments/ivf/ [https://perma.cc/5MG3-6B88].
8. Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 175 (N.Y. 1998).
9. See, e.g., Danielle & Andy Mayoras, Embryo Lawsuit Between Sofia Vergara and Nick Loeb
Getting Out of Hand, FORBES (Nov. 18, 2016, 8:48 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
trialandheirs/2016/11/18/embryo-lawsuit-between-sofia-vergara-and-nick-loeb-getting-out-of-hand/
#7c3011175cd0; Katie Mettler, Frozen Pre-Embryos: Life or ‘Marital Property’? Mo. Court Decides
Tough Custody Case, WASH. POST (Nov. 17, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/morning-mix/wp/2016/11/17/ex-husband-in-frozen-embryo-dispute-cant-be-forced-to-becomea-father-mo-court-rules/?utm_term=.4d54c751f3c5
[https://perma.cc/XN86-U64R];
Madeline
Schwartz, Who Owns Pre-Embryos?, NEW YORKER (Apr. 28, 2015), http://www.newyorker.com/
tech/elements/who-owns-pre-embryos [https://perma.cc/5CDC-BHSD].
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As of this Note’s publication, only two appellate decisions dealing
with sole-progenitor disputes have been issued,10 and the solutions posed
by these courts are not ideal. Courts have attempted to apply current
dual-progenitor analyses to the sole-progenitor context, but they simply do
not apply in the same fashion. Sole-progenitor situations are very different
from dual-progenitor situations and should be subject to a different
analysis;
[b]ecause an individual who lacks a genetic connection to an embryo
has a lesser stake in how the embryo is disposed, the resolution of
disputes over the disposition of embryos created with donor sperm
and/or eggs requires a different set of rules than those that apply to
disputes over embryos created with both partners’ gametes.11

Therefore, because analyses applied in the dual-progenitor context are not
appropriate in the sole-progenitor context, the partner whose genetic
material was not used must rely on different theories if they want to claim
ownership over any frozen embryos at the time of divorce. These theories
can range from marital presumption or community property rights to
claims of parentage through intentionality. However, as this Note will
argue, none of these claims of ownership by the non-genetic spouse are
sufficient to overcome concerns of forced procreation on the genetic
progenitor. It is unconscionable for a court to allow a non-genetic spouse
to have embryos implanted that will force the genetic progenitor of those
embryos to become a parent against his or her will. Under current
analytical frameworks, this is a distinct possibility. Because of this
concern and the lack of sufficient remedies provided by the current
frameworks, this Note advocates for a new framework that favors genetics
over all other considerations and awards absolute ownership rights to the
sole-genetic progenitor.
This genetic framework will encourage judicial efficiency by
creating a bright line rule not only for courts but also for couples
considering IVF—giving couples more clarity as to the disposition of their
embryos should they separate. Disputes involving only one genetic
progenitor will likely continue to arise as IVF technology becomes more
common and affordable. Additionally, as same-sex marriage is now legal
across all the states, same-sex couples will likely engage in efforts to have
children, which may involve IVF, and may get divorced.12 These issues
10. See Litowitz v. Litowitz, 48 P.3d 261 (Wash. 2002); In re Marriage of Nash, 2009 WL
1514842, at *1 (Wash. App. 2009).
11. Coleman, supra note 2, at 115.
12. See Paige Chamberlain Ornduff, Who Gets the Bun That Doesn’t Make It to the Oven? The
Rights to Pre-Embryos for Individuals in Same-Sex Relationships, 8 CHARLESTON L. REV. 557,
582–90 (2014).
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are only beginning and this Note seeks to shed some light on this growing
area of law.
Part I of this Note provides some background on the current
frameworks being used by courts in dual-progenitor disputes, while Part
II presents the only two cases to deal with sole-genetic progenitor disputes
and details how the courts conducted their analyses. Part III explains how
courts establish legal parentage and how these legal parentage standards
apply to frozen embryo disputes, specifically ones that involve only one
genetic progenitor. Part IV proposes a new genetic framework to assist in
the resolution of these issues. This Note concludes with a recommendation
for future legislative intervention to aid in the widespread and uniform
resolution of these types of disputes.
I. DUAL-GENETIC PROGENITOR FRAMEWORKS
While frozen embryo jurisprudence is still developing, courts have
settled on three main analyses to resolve disputes. However, before a court
can begin to do an analysis under one of these analytical frameworks, the
court must first determine what type of property is in dispute.13 The court
must ask: What is an embryo? Is it property, a child, or something in
between: a special kind of property with protections and considerations?14
Most courts find that the embryo is a special kind of property.15 One
court succinctly stated that embryos are not “persons” or “property,” but
instead “occupy an interim category that entitles them to special respect
because of their potential for human life.”16 This means that each party has
an ownership interest in the embryo, in that they have decision-making
authority over its disposition, but they do not have true property interests.17
After a court determines the property category that the embryo
occupies, it must then decide which analysis is proper to determine
ownership rights or custody of the embryo.18 The analytical frameworks
that have been developed are the (1) contemporaneous mutual assent
approach,19 (2) contractual approach,20 and (3) balancing test approach.21
It is relevant to note that these frameworks have arisen through
13. Id. at 568.
14. See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 594–97 (Tenn. 1992).
15. See id. at 597.
16. Id.
17. See id.
18. Ornduff, supra note 12, at 570.
19. See In re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768, 782 (Iowa 2003).
20. See Szafranski v. Dunston, 34 N.E.3d 1132, 1137 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015); Kass v. Kass, 696
N.E.2d 174, 181 (N.Y. 1998); In re Marriage of Dahl, 194 P.3d 834, 840 (Or. Ct. App. 2008); Davis,
842 S.W.2d at 597; Roman v. Roman, 193 S.W.3d 40, 50 (Tex. Ct. App. 2006); Litowitz v. Litowitz,
48 P.3d 261, 268 (Wash. 2002).
21. See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 603.
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dual-progenitor disputes, where both spouses have contributed genetic
material to the creation of an embryo.
A. Contemporaneous Mutual Assent Approach
One of the frameworks used by courts when deciding disputes
involving frozen embryos is the contemporaneous mutual assent approach.
Under this framework, “decisions about the disposition of frozen embryos
belong to the couple that created the embryo, with each partner entitled to
an equal say in how the embryos should be disposed.”22 This approach
proposes that “no embryo should be used by either partner, donated to
another patient, used in research, or destroyed without the mutual consent
of the couple that created the embryo.”23 Under this approach,
advance instructions would not be treated as binding contracts. If
either partner has a change of mind about disposition decisions made
in advance, that person’s current objection would take precedence
over the prior consent. If one of the partners rescinds an advance
disposition decision and the other does not, the mutual consent
principle would not be satisfied and the previously agreed-upon
disposition decision could not be carried out.24

One court implemented a contemporaneous mutual assent–contractual
hybrid approach and held that parties’ prior agreements were and are
binding unless either party changes his or her mind about the disposition
of any frozen embryos.25 The court found it would be against public policy
to “enforce a prior agreement between the parties in this highly personal
area of reproductive choice when one of the parties has changed his or her
mind.”26
The biggest flaw with this framework is that it may cause the parties
to reach a “stalemate.”27 As one court noted, “This approach strikes us as
being totally unrealistic. If the parties could reach an agreement, they
would not be in court.”28 Moreover, it places a lot of power in the hands
of the parties to reject the other party’s proposed use of the embryos,
causing potentially drawn-out and contentious litigation. For these
reasons, this approach is both unfavorable and unrealistic.

22. Coleman, supra note 2, at 81.
23. Id. at 110.
24. Id. at 110–11.
25. In re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768, 782 (Iowa 2003) (quoting J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d
707, 719 (N.J. 2001)).
26. Id. at 781.
27. Ornduff, supra note 12, at 574.
28. Reber v. Reiss, 42 A.3d 1131, 1135 n.5 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012).
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B. Contractual Approach
The most popular framework is the contractual approach. Using the
contractual approach, courts evaluate the contract(s) that the parties
entered into when commencing the IVF process, most often with the IVF
facility.29 This is a simple way for courts to examine the parties’ intent
before the embryo existed.
In Kass v. Kass, a New York court found that the consent form the
couple signed prior to undergoing the IVF process was a binding
agreement that indicated their mutual assent to donate their embryos30 for
research in the event of divorce.31 Both parties later signed a divorce
agreement stating that the frozen embryos should be disposed of in a
manner outlined in the consent form and that neither party nor anyone else
would lay claim to custody.32 About a month later, the wife filed an action
for sole custody of the embryos so that she could try the implantation
process again and have another child.33 The husband maintained his desire
for the embryos to be donated for research, as the couple had agreed in
their initial contract.34 The Court of Appeals, the highest court in New
York, found that the agreement was binding and manifested a mutual
assent that the embryos be donated for research.35
In Kass, the court relied upon the original contract as evidence of the
parties’ intent before the embryos came into existence.36 Because there
was a contract involved, the court was tasked with enforcing the contract
and using it as evidence of the parties’ prior intent.37 Proponents of this
approach find that using contracts is a much easier way for courts to
adjudicate issues like this one because it does not require the court to
evaluate or balance the interests and desires of the parties. Moreover,
courts have held that an agreement, specifically regarding the disposition

29. See Coleman, supra note 2, at 71.
30. The court in Kass chose to use the term “‘pre-zygotes,’ which are defined in the record as
‘eggs which have been penetrated by sperm but have not yet joined genetic material.’” Kass v. Kass,
696 N.E.2d 174, n.1 (N.Y. 1998) (internal citation omitted).
31. Id. at 181.
32. Id. at 177.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 175.
35. Id. at 181; see also In re Marriage of Dahl, 194 P.3d 834, 842 (Or. Ct. App. 2008) (finding
that the agreement signed by the couple designating custody/exclusive rights to transfer or dispose of
the embryos to the wife indicated intent for the wife to get custody); Roman v. Roman, 193 S.W.3d
40, 50 (Tex. App. 2006) (finding that an agreement providing that embryos were to be discarded at
the time of divorce served state public policy by allowing parties to voluntarily decide the disposition
of the frozen embryos prior to cryopreservation).
36. Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 180–81.
37. Id. at 182.
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of frozen embryos, should be presumed valid and enforced as between the
progenitors.38
However, critics of the contractual approach argue that it
“insufficiently protects the individual and societal interests at stake.”39
Take Massachusetts for example, where the Supreme Court declined to
honor an advance agreement regarding the disposition of embryos on
public policy grounds in A.Z. v. B.Z.40 The couple had signed an agreement
stating that in the event of divorce or separation, the embryos would be
returned to the wife for implantation.41 While the couple was separated,
the wife had one embryo implanted.42 During the divorce proceedings, the
husband filed for an injunction to prevent the wife from implanting any
more embryos.43 The court refused to enforce the original IVF agreement
granting the wife use of the embryos because it would compel the husband
to become a parent against his will.44 “As a matter of public policy, [the
court] conclude[d] that forced procreation is not an area amenable to
judicial enforcement.”45
In Davis v. Davis, the Supreme Court of Tennessee reached a similar
conclusion. While that court found that agreements between progenitors
should be presumed valid and be enforced, in the event that there is no
prior agreement between the parties, the court must instead weigh the
interests and burdens of the parties.46 In weighing the interests of the
parties, heavy favor should be shown towards a party wishing to avoid
procreation.47 The court recognized that “[o]rdinarily, the party wishing to
avoid procreating should prevail, assuming that the other party has a
reasonable possibility of achieving parenthood by means other than use of
the preembryos in question.”48 Applying this holding, if given a
dual-progenitor situation where one party wants to implant the embryos
and have more children while the other party wants to dispose of or donate
the embryos, the court should rule in favor of the party wishing to dispose
of or donate the embryos because otherwise, the court would essentially
be forcing the other party to become a biological parent against that party’s

38. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 597 (Tenn. 1992).
39. See Coleman, supra note 2, at 88.
40. A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051, 1057–58 (Mass. 2000).
41. Id. at 1054.
42. Id. at 1053.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 1057–58.
45. Id.
46. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 604 (Tenn. 1992).
47. Id.
48. Id.
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will. As the court in A.Z. v. B.Z. expressed, this is a violation of public
policy.49
Notwithstanding these concerns, the Davis court found that this
preference for avoiding forced procreation is not absolute.50 It may be
overcome by a showing that the party wishing to implant the embryos
cannot achieve biological parenthood through any other means.51 This
situation usually arises in situations where one party is rendered infertile
due to medical treatment but was able to contribute gametes to make
embryos prior to the treatments.52 Under those circumstances, the
presumption against forced procreation can be overcome to aid parties in
exercising their constitutional rights to be parents.53
While the contractual approach is more straightforward because
courts are only tasked with enforcing the contracts signed by the parties,
which indicate a clear manifestation of the parties’ intent regarding
disposition of any remaining embryos, contracts that allow for the
possibility of forced procreation create serious public policy concerns.
C. Balancing Test Approach
The last analytical framework that courts consider to resolve frozen
embryo disputes is the balancing test approach. Using the balancing test,
a court weighs “the parties’ relative interests with respect to the
[embryos].”54 Consider Reber v. Reiss, where the court found that the
balancing approach was the more suitable test and that often a party’s
inability to have a child will weigh in that party’s favor.55 In Reber, a
couple created embryos through IVF prior to the wife undergoing
chemotherapy for breast cancer.56 When the couple split up, the wife
wanted ownership of the embryos so she could implant them, as they were
her only chance to have biological children.57 However, the husband
wanted the embryos to be destroyed and discarded.58 The court found that
49. A.Z., 725 N.E.2d at 1057–58.
50. See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 604.
51. Id. Cf. J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707, 717 (N.J. 2001) (finding that, in balancing the interests,
the wife’s right to not procreate outweighed the husband’s right to procreate because he had other
reasonable means of reproducing).
52. See, e.g., Szafranski v. Dunston, 34 N.E.3d 1132, 1136 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015) (appellee
commenced the IVF process to cryopreserve embryos before being treated for lymphoma, treatments
for which would likely render her infertile); Reber v. Reiss, 42 A.3d 1131, 1132–33 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2012) (wife underwent the IVF procedure to freeze embryos prior to treatment for breast cancer).
53. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (holding that one has a basic,
fundamental right to procreate and be a parent).
54. Szafranski, 34 N.E.3d at 1161.
55. Reber, 42 A.3d at 1142.
56. Id. at 1132–33.
57. Id. at 1133.
58. Id.
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the wife’s desire and inability to have children outweighed the husband’s
desire to not be a forced biological parent.59 The court granted her
ownership of the embryos because she had no reasonable alternative to
biological procreation.60 This decision perfectly exemplifies the
suggestion by the Davis61 court that the presumption against forced
procreation is not absolute and can be overcome.
However, allowing courts to balance the interests of the parties
involves more judicial interference than the contractual or
contemporaneous mutual assent approaches, making the balancing test a
less desirable framework. While the balancing test approach does give the
court more leeway to consider all facets of the issue, it also gives the court
a large amount of discretion in deciding these cases, which may lead to
more appeals and a general lack of consensus. Additionally, there are
public policy concerns that courts should not interfere and make decisions
in this very personal and emotional area of a person’s life.62
II. SOLE-GENETIC PROGENITOR CASES
Only two appellate cases have been decided thus far where only one
of the parties to the litigation was a genetic progenitor.63 In these cases,
the courts attempted to apply the above analytical frameworks in order to
resolve the disputes but ran into problems.
A. Litowitz v. Litowitz
In Litowitz v. Litowitz, the Washington State Supreme Court decided
a case of first impression regarding the disposition of frozen embryos64
when only one of the parties was the genetic progenitor.65 The married
couple created five embryos, with sperm from the husband and eggs from
a donor.66 The couple had three of the embryos implanted into a surrogate
who delivered a child, while the remaining two embryos stayed frozen in

59. Id. at 1134; see also Szafranski, 34 N.E.3d at 1161 (affirming a determination based on both
an oral contract and a balancing test that the appellee’s right to procreate outweighed the interests of
the appellant to avoid forced procreation because she had created the embryos before undergoing
medical treatment that rendered her infertile).
60. Reber, 42 A.3d at 1142.
61. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 604 (Tenn. 1992).
62. In re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768, 779 (Iowa 2003); see also Eisenstadt v. Baird,
405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
63. See Litowitz v. Litowitz, 48 P.3d 261, 263 (Wash. 2002); In re Marriage of Nash, 2009 WL
1514842, at *1 (Wash. App. 2009).
64. The court refers to the entity as a “pre-embryo.” Litowitz, 48 P.3d at 262. For simplicity’s
sake, this Note will only use the term “embryo.” See text accompanying supra note 2.
65. Litowitz, 48 P.3d at 262, 265.
66. Id. at 262.
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cryogenic storage.67 The couple had entered into a contract with the IVF
facility and mutually agreed that after five years, the embryos were to be
thawed but not allowed to undergo further development, unless the couple
was granted an extension.68 The contract also stated in the event that the
parties are unable to reach a mutual agreement regarding the disposition
of the embryos, that the couple must petition the court for determination.69
When the couple divorced, the wife expressed her desire to implant
the embryos in a surrogate in order to have more children, while the
husband wanted to put the remaining embryos up for adoption.70 The
parties had entered into a contract with the egg donor, which gave sole
rights of ownership over the eggs to the husband and wife.71 The wife
argued that she should be awarded equal rights to the remaining embryos
by virtue of the egg donor contract, as she could not claim a right of
ownership arising from biology.72 The wife argued that because both she
and her husband had equal rights to the eggs, they also had equal rights to
the resulting embryos.73 The court did not agree.74 It recognized that the
donor contract gave equal rights to the couple over the eggs but that those
ownership rights did not extend to the embryos; any rights the wife had to
the eggs via the egg donor contract were extinguished when the eggs were
fertilized.75 The ownership rights did not transfer because the eggs became
new entities: embryos.76 The court recognized that because the wife had
not contributed any genetic material to these embryos and was not
biologically related to them, “any right she may have to the [embryos]
must be based solely upon contract.”77 As a result, the court applied the
contractual approach and evaluated each party’s rights based upon the
contract they entered into with the IVF facility.78
In adopting this contractual approach, the court declined to address
the relevant issues associated with sole-progenitor disputes and only held
that the contract should be enforced as written, which provided for the
thawing of the embryos.79 In reaching this determination, the court found:
67. Id. at 262–63.
68. Id. at 263–64.
69. Id. at 263.
70. Id. at 264.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 267.
73. Id. at 266, 267.
74. Id. at 267.
75. Id. at 269.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 267.
78. Id. at 271.
79. Id. This case was peculiar in that the court did not actually award the embryos to either party.
The court only held that the contract should be enforced as written, which provided for the thawing of
the embryos. It did note that because more than five years had passed since the execution of the
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“It is not necessary for this court to engage in a legal, medical or
philosophical discussion whether the [embryos] in this case are ‘children,’
nor whether Petitioner (who was not a biological participant) is a
progenitor as is Respondent (who was a biological participant).”80 In so
holding, the court failed to set a firm and guiding precedent.
B. In re Marriage of Nash
Similarly, in In re Marriage of Nash, the court began with a
contractual analysis when dealing with another sole-genetic progenitor
case; however, the court was unable to reach a determination and ended
up applying a balancing test.81 In this case, a married couple used IVF to
inject the husband’s sperm into donor eggs, and when the couple got
divorced, they had to decide who should have ownership over the
remaining embryos.82 The wife wanted the embryos to be disposed of, but
the husband wanted to keep them in case he decided to have more children
through a surrogate.83 Interestingly, the contract the couple signed with the
fertility clinic gave the wife, who did not contribute genetic material, the
rights to the embryos if the parties divorced and the issue was not
addressed in the settlement.84 In an odd twist, because the parties
addressed this issue during mediation, even though they did not fully
resolve it, the court concluded that the issue was addressed in the
settlement, and therefore, the wife no longer had a right to the embryos by
way of the contract.85 Because the contract was no longer applicable, the
appellate court applied a balancing test and affirmed the trial court’s
decision to award the father, as the genetic progenitor, the embryos, noting
that the wife did not have any prospective parental rights to the embryos.86
This case follows a similar pattern as Litowitz: any rights to the
embryos that the wife could claim could only be based on contract because
she had no biological or genetic connection to the embryos.87 However,
the distinction here is that the Nash contract was no longer applicable to
the situation and therefore could not be enforced, unlike the contract in
Litowitz. Because the contract could not be relied upon in Nash, the court
contract, and there was no evidence in the record to indicate whether the parties had requested an
extension, the embryos in question could very well have been destroyed, which would render the case
moot. Id. at 269–71.
80. Id. at 271.
81. In re Marriage of Nash, 2009 WL 1514842, at *5 (Wash. App. 2009).
82. Id. at *1, *3.
83. Id. at *3.
84. Id.
85. Id. at *3, *5.
86. Id. at *1, *7.
87. See id. at *7; Litowitz v. Litowitz, 48 P.3d 261, 267 (Wash. 2002).
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had to find an alternative solution and chose to balance the interests of the
parties.
While neither of these cases provides a good model of analysis due
to the strange five-year disposition provision potentially rendering the case
moot in Litowitz and the odd drafting that created uncertainty in Nash, they
do show that sole-progenitor cases are different than dual-progenitor
cases. In both of these cases, the courts touched on the lack of a genetic
connection between one party and the embryos and how that makes for a
weaker claim of ownership rights. As Litowitz recognized, the genetic
progenitor has a claim arising out of genetics, but the non-progenitor must
rely on alternative claims of ownership.88 Therefore, in this kind of
situation, the non-progenitor must rely on a claim arising out of parentage
in an effort to stake a claim of ownership on any frozen embryos. This
Note will now explore the various ways one may assert a legal right of
parentage.
III. PARENTAGE IN THE FROZEN EMBRYO CONTEXT
When applying one of the dual-progenitor analytical frameworks,89
courts often engage in a discussion of the rights and interests of the parties
as parents as a way to establish ownership or responsibility.90 Parties have
argued that they have ownership rights to embryos as a result of their role
in the creation of the embryos or through their status as a potential legal
parent. There are three main ways to determine who is a legal parent: (1)
marital and gestational presumption, (2) biology, and (3) intentionality.
While all methods are relevant, the intentionality argument is the main
argument that a non-progenitor will have to rely on in a frozen embryo
dispute.
A. Marital and Gestational Presumptions
Marital and gestational presumptions have traditionally been the
primary statutory mechanisms through which parentage is determined.
Gestational presumption presumes that a woman who gives birth to a child
is the legal mother of that child.91 Similarly, the marital presumption
presumes that the husband of a woman who gives birth to a child is the
child’s legal father.92 If this marital presumption does not exist because the
88. See Litowitz, 48 P.3d at 267.
89. See supra Part I.
90. See, e.g., Litowitz, 48 P.3d at 267–68; In re Marriage of Nash, 2009 WL 1514842, at *7
(Wash. App. 2009); see also infra Part III.C–D.
91. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (UPA) § 201(a) (amended 2002) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002).
92. UPA §§ 201(b), 204(a). The UPA has been fully adopted by Alabama, Delaware, Illinois,
Maine, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Texas, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming. Legislative
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mother of a child is unmarried, then the father may establish paternity
through genetic testing or an acknowledgement of paternity.93
However, these gestational and marital presumptions cannot be
applied to determine ownership in the frozen embryo context. The main
argument against these presumptions for frozen embryos is that these
presumptions apply to children born to a woman.94 In cases involving
frozen embryos, a child has not yet been born or even implanted in a
uterus, and thus a mother cannot assert a claim of ownership based off
marital or gestational presumption.
Moreover, these methods are outdated for determining parentage.
Traditionally, these presumptions have been used to determine which
people are the biological parents of a child, and thus the legal parents. But
in our current, modern age, people often become parents to children that
are not biologically connected to them—whether through adoption,
surrogacy, or in vitro fertilization with a donor. Additionally, in the wake
of the legalization of same-sex marriage, courts are now presented with
the question of how to establish parentage for children born to same-sex
couples, where only one spouse is the biological parent.95 Because there
are now so many different ways to form a family and have children, courts
and legislatures have been forced to create new definitions for “legal
parent” that extend beyond mere presumption.
B. Biology
The biological, or genetic-identity, approach determines parentage
based upon who the biological parents of the child are or who is genetically
related to the child.96 This approach recognizes that
an important aspect of parenthood is the experience of creating
another in one’s “own likeness.” Part of what makes parenthood
Fact Sheet-Parentage Act, UNIF. LAW COMM’N, http://www.uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet.
aspx?title=Parentage%20Act [https://perma.cc/7RTQ-EX6B].
93. UPA § 201(b).
94. UPA § 201(a)(1), (4).
95. See June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Marriage and the Marital Presumption Post-Obergefell,
84 UMKC L. REV. 663 (2016); Nancy D. Polikoff, A Mother Should Not Have to Adopt Her Own
Child: Parentage Laws for Children of Lesbian Couples in the Twenty-First Century, 5 STAN. J. C.R.
& C.L. 201 (2009); Jennifer L. Rosato, Children of Same-Sex Parents Deserve the Security Blanket of
the Parentage Presumption, 44 FAM. CT. REV. 74 (2006); see also Della Corte v. Ramirez, 961 N.E.2d
601, 602 (Mass. App. Ct. 2012) (former same-sex spouse of child’s mother was the same as “husband”
under the statute); Shineovich & Kemp v. Shineovich, 214 P.3d 29, 40 (Or. Ct. App. 2009) (statute
granting legal parentage to husbands of women who conceived by artificial insemination extended to
cover same-sex domestic partners).
96. Belsito v. Clark, 644 N.E.2d 760, 767 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 1994) (concluding that when a
child is delivered by a gestational surrogate, the natural parents of the child shall be determined based
on which individuals are the genetic parents).
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meaningful is the parent’s ability to see the child grow and develop
and see oneself in the process of this growth. Through this process,
the parent views himself or herself as a creative agent in nature.97

Additionally, this approach can be diluted down to a simple property
argument that “persons possess property rights in the products, processes,
and organs of their bodies and in any commodities developed from these
sources.”98 Because a child is a result of the products (sperm and eggs) and
the processes (gestation) of the parents, the child is therefore property of
the parents.99
Again, this approach fails to take into account the various other ways
in which families form. This argument is also not one that a non-progenitor
can rely upon in asserting a claim of parentage and ownership, for obvious
reasons.
C. Intentionality
One of the newest and broadest approaches to parentage is
intentionality. The intentionality approach finds that the legal parents of a
child are the people who intended to be the parents of a child.100 This often
arises in surrogacy cases where a surrogate may have a statutory claim to
parentage over the child through a gestational presumption, but the legal
parents are the ones who intended to be the parents of the child and
initiated the procreative process.101 The theory is that if it weren’t for the
actions of those people, then the child in question would not exist.102
The intentionality analysis is illustrated well by In re Marriage of
Buzzanca.103 In this case, a couple acquired eggs and sperm from donors
and used IVF to create an embryo.104 This embryo was then implanted into
a surrogate who was to carry the baby to term and then turn the child over
to the couple.105 However, during the pregnancy, the couple split up and
the husband decided he no longer wanted the child.106 The trial court was
then presented with six possible parents for this baby and concluded that

97. John Lawrence Hill, What Does It Mean to Be A “Parent”? The Claims of Biology as the
Basis for Parental Rights, 66 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 353, 389 (1991) (emphasis in original).
98. Id. at 391.
99. For a discussion of why biology is not always sufficient to convey procreative rights, see
generally id.
100. See In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 282 (1998); Johnson v. Calvert, 851
P.2d 776, 782 (Cal. 1993); see also Hill, supra note 97, at 414.
101. See, e.g., Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 282; Johnson, 851 P.2d at 782.
102. See id.; Hill, supra note 97, at 414–15.
103. See Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 280.
104. Id. at 282.
105. Id.
106. Id.
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none of them could be the legal parents, and therefore the child had no
legal parents.107 The appellate court disagreed.108
In regard to the gamete donors, the appellate court found that, while
the unknown donors may have a genetic claim to the child, the intended
parents had a superior claim based on intentionality, which acts as a
tiebreaker in the event of a conflict.109 Today, the egg and sperm donors
would be found to have relinquished their parentage rights upon donation
and unable to be considered legal parents.110 The current Uniform
Parentage Act (UPA) plainly states the parentage status of a donor: a donor
is not a parent of a child conceived by means of assisted reproduction.111
However, this statute was not in effect at the time of Buzzanca,112 and
further, because the donors were unknown to the court, the appellate court
did not spend much time arguing that the donors could be the legal
parents.113 Thus, the genetic donors were rejected as legal parents, which
left the surrogate and the intended parents of the child for legal parent
consideration.114
The surrogate’s basis for legal parentage arose from gestational
maternity—she gave birth to the child.115 However, the appellate court
found that the contract between the intended parents and the surrogate
deemed the surrogate only a carrier, and but for the consent of the intended
parents to allow the surrogate to carry and gestate the embryo, the child
would not have been born.116
The appellate court concluded that the intended parents were the
legal parents of the child because of their responsibility for creating the
child and their intention at the time of implantation to be the legal parents
of the child.117 Because this couple brought all these people together to
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 288 (finding that the Johnson decision would mandate that intentionality be the
tiebreaker).
110. UPA § 702.
111. See id.
112. UPA § 702 was not enacted until 2000. The 1973 version of the UPA did not contain a
provision regarding assisted reproduction; however, it did contain a provision which specified that a
male donor would not be considered the father of a child born of artificial insemination if the sperm
was provided to a licensed physician for use in artificial insemination of a married woman other than
the donor’s wife. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 702 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2000) (citing UNIF. ACT ON
PARENTAGE § 5(b) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1973)).
113. See Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 285–86.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 282.
116. Id. at 288.
117. See id. at 282–83. Additionally, the court relied on older precedent to establish paternity by
estoppel, which found that a man or woman is responsible for a child born during the marriage as a
result of medical procedures. Id. at 286–88 (relying on People v. Sorensen, 437 P.2d 495 (Cal. 1968)).
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help them create a child and but for their actions, they were determined to
be the legal and responsible parents.118
This approach could be applicable in a sole-progenitor,
frozen-embryo dispute because it provides a method that the
non-progenitor spouse could utilize to establish parentage rights over the
embryo. As has been discussed, the non-progenitor would need to
establish rights through either contract or intentionality because biology
and marital and gestational presumptions are not applicable. However,
conflicts between intentionality and biology in the existing case law
demonstrate that a non-progenitor argument based solely upon
intentionality is likely to fail.
D. Conflict Between Biology and Intentionality
An interesting case arose in California that discussed both
intentionality and biology—Johnson v. Calvert.119 The court found that
maternity could only be established through intentionality after both
gestational and genetic options had been exhausted.120 The applicable
statute was a part of the California Civil Code adopted from a section of
the Uniform Parentage Act.121
In Johnson, a couple contracted with a surrogate to carry their genetic
embryo (embryo formed with husband’s sperm and wife’s egg).122 Things
did not go well, and after relations between the couple and the surrogate
mother broke down, the couple filed for a declaratory judgment to
establish that they were the legal parents of the unborn child.123 The
surrogate claimed that she was the mother of the child based on the fact
that she would gestate and deliver the child,124 a valid form of proof of
maternity under California law.125 The genetic mother based her claim on
the fact that she was the biological mother of the child, also a valid form
of proof of maternity.126 Because the statute127 recognized both forms,
genetic and gestational, as establishing maternity, the court then moved to
look at intentionality in order to resolve the dispute.128 The court
recognized that the genetic mother had greater intentionality because, but
118. See id.
119. Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993).
120. See id. at 782.
121. Id. at 778–79.
122. Id. at 777–78.
123. Id. at 778.
124. Id. at 779.
125. Id. at 780.
126. Id. at 779.
127. Id. at 778–79.
128. Id. at 782.
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for her acts, the child would never be born.129 It was the genetic mother
and father’s intention to have the surrogate carry the child and then return
it to the couple to raise; it was not their intention to donate an embryo to
the surrogate.130 Because the court found that the statute in question did
not indicate a preference for genetic mother over gestational mother, or
vice versa, it chose to look at intentionality as the “tiebreaker” in order to
select one legal mother.131 The court concluded that the genetic, intentional
mother had the superior claim.132
While this intentionality framework establishes a common law way
for the parent of a child born of assisted reproductive technology to
establish parentage without being genetically related to or having birthed
the child, it does not apply to sole-progenitor disputes. If this framework
is applied to situations where only one spouse or “parent” is the genetic
“parent” of a frozen embryo, then the intentionality argument never
becomes relevant. In a dispute involving only one genetic “parent,” there
is no dispute between a genetic and gestational mother because the “child”
has not yet been born––there is no gestational mother. Therefore,
as Johnson only looked to intentionality as a tiebreaker,133 a
biological/genetic claim of parentage would trump any claim that another
parent may have arising out of intentionality because intentionality should
only come into play after other options have been exhausted.
IV. PROPOSAL: ABSOLUTE GENETICS FRAMEWORK FOR
SOLE-PROGENITOR DISPUTES
As a result of this panoply of court decisions regarding frozen
embryos, a new framework should be adopted. Both of the courts that were
presented with sole-progenitor disputes, Litowitz and Nash, seemed to
struggle with how to resolve these personal family issues when a contract
either is not applicable or does not provide a sufficient solution. Both
courts could have used a different framework to guide the analysis, as none
of the current dual-progenitor frameworks were ideal given the situation
presented. This Note advocates for a framework for the disposition of
frozen embryos where the sole-genetic progenitor is always awarded sole
custody and/or ownership rights in a dispute.
This framework, which would favor the genetic progenitor in an
absolute sense, is a more favorable framework for sole-progenitor disputes
because the current frameworks either do not adequately resolve the
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 782.
132. Id. at 781–82.
133. Id. at 782.
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conflict or create too many foreseeable public policy concerns. The current
frameworks (contemporaneous mutual consent,134 balancing test,135 and
contractual136) simply do not work in a sole-progenitor dispute. The
contemporaneous mutual assent framework is impractical; if the parties
could agree on what to do with the embryo(s), they would not be in
court.137 While the balancing test does allow the court to consider each
party’s wishes and burdens, and any public policy concerns, it gives the
court too much power. It places the entire outcome in the trial judge’s
hands, which will inevitably lead to inconsistent rulings, more potential
for abuse of discretion, and many appeals. An ideal, long-term solution
would involve a broadly applicable standard, such as a uniform code for
states to adopt, to guide judges or legislatures in making determinations.
Neither the contemporaneous mutual assent approach nor the balancing
test is a viable, long-term solution for these types of disputes.
While most courts seem to favor the contractual approach, this
approach too has one major flaw: it allows for the possibility that a person
may be forced to become a parent against their will. This public policy
concern that other courts have highlighted138 is so important that it must
outweigh the benefits of relying on the parties’ contract. Holding people
to earlier contracts when it could result in a person being forced to
surrender or dispose of an embryo created with their genetic material or
become a parent to a biological child that they do not want is simply
unconscionable. Additionally,
couples entering into premarital contracts often suffer from optimism
bias. . . . This unfounded optimism may lead individuals to enter into
deals that will not serve their interests in the future. Couples
contemplating embryo disposition decisions likely share this
optimism about the solidity of their marriage. Moreover, as we have
seen, the social science research on embryo disposition decision
making strongly confirms that parties entering into such agreements,
at least at the time of treatment, will have difficulty forecasting their
future views about disposition and exercising rational judgment.139

While proponents of the contractual approach rely on contracts as
manifestations of prior intent regarding the disposition of frozen embryos,
these manifestations are not reliable. These contracts are executed while
134. See supra Part I.A.
135. See supra Part I.C.
136. See supra Part I.B.
137. Reber v. Reiss, 42 A.3d 1131, 1135 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012).
138. See cases cited supra Part I.C.
139. Deborah L. Forman, Embryo Disposition, Divorce & Family Law Contracting: A Model for
Enforceability, 24 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 378, 431 (2013).
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the couples are still together, planning for their future, and theoretically,
believing they will never divorce. While it is typically public policy to
hold people to their prior agreements, because of the nature of
the “property” involved—an embryo with the potential to become a
child—and the circumstances under which the agreements are usually
executed, they should not be honored in the sole-progenitor context. The
public policy argument against forced procreation and against allowing an
“uninvolved” party control over your “property” must outweigh the
arguments in favor of honoring contracts. If a genetic progenitor wishes to
relinquish their embryo to the non-genetically related spouse, they can still
do so through adoption or other later-executed contracts. Further, if parties
do not have an enforceable contract, they are left with no satisfactory
framework at all.
Those seeking to invalidate the argument that forced procreation
should be avoided at all costs would point to instances where a person has
no alternative means to beget biological children other than the frozen
embryos created with their gametes. These cases tend to show that while
courts seek to protect people from being forced to become biological
parents, this rule is not absolute and can be overcome by a showing that
the other party has no other reasonable means of biological procreation.140
Proponents of the contractual approach would ask: What about people who
are no longer able to have children of their own? Should they be forced to
surrender their only hopes of having biologically related children just
because their partner has changed his/her mind and no longer wants to be
a parent? While these are valid concerns, none of these issues are relevant
because those issues assume the embryo has been created with two
biological parents. This proposed genetic framework should only be
applied to sole-progenitor disputes. In sole-progenitor disputes, only one
spouse is the genetic progenitor; thus, there can never be a situation where
one’s right not to procreate is violated in order to allow another his/her
only chance at becoming a biological parent. While the contractual
approach may be the best framework for dual-progenitor disputes, it is not
the best for sole-progenitor disputes.
The public policy of avoiding forced procreation is one of the
primary concerns that this genetic framework seeks to address. For a court
to affirmatively allow another person to cause your child to be born against
your will would violate your right to be free from unwanted governmental

140. See, e.g., Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 597 (Tenn. 1992); Szafranski v. Dunston, 34
N.E.3d 1132, 1137 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015); Reber v. Reiss, 42 A.3d 1131, 1132–33 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012).
Cf. J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707, 717 (N.J. 2001).
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intrusion on this private, personal area of life.141 It is also not good policy
to allow a court to award a non-progenitor an embryo, something that has
the potential for life, over and against any opposition from a genetic
progenitor. Even if contrary to a contract, the sole progenitors should
always be awarded the embryos by virtue of their genetic connection and
the other spouse’s lack of genetic connection.
Some may argue that intentionality is a valid way to establish
parentage and that the non-biological “parent” has rights as an intended
parent. The spouses came together and formed an embryo jointly with the
intention to birth and parent a child together. However, genetics remains
one of the primary ways to establish parentage; because the embryo was
created using that person’s genetic material, this person would be
considered the legal and natural parent of any resulting child.142 The other
person, who does not share any genetics with the embryo, therefore has
two main ways to establish legal parentage over any resulting child:
marital presumption143 or intentionality.144 As discussed previously,
marital presumption applies to children who have been born;145 as the
embryo is only a frozen embryo and not a born child, this presumption
does not yet apply. The non-biologically connected person is then left with
an argument for rights arising out of intentionality: he or she is the
intended parent of this embryo, but for the actions of this person and
his/her spouse, the embryo would not exist.146 However, there is no intent
until the embryo has been implanted and has the active potential to become
a child. To that end, courts have stated that the value of embryos lie in
their “potential to become, after implantation, growth and birth,
children.”147
This point of implantation is an important distinction. It has appeared
in statutes and cases. Many states have enacted statutes that address frozen
embryo disputes.148
These statutes seek to clarify that if a marriage dissolves or, in some
cases, a dissolution action is filed, prior to placement of gametes or
141. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972). A possible constitutional argument could
also be made under a right to privacy, however that is outside the scope of this Note. See generally
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
142. See supra Part III.
143. See supra Part III.A.
144. See supra Part III.C.
145. See supra Part III.A.
146. See supra Part III.C.
147. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 598 (Tenn. 1992) (emphasis in original) (citing appellee’s
brief).
148. COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-4-106 (7)(a) (2011); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-20-64 (2011); TEX.
FAM. CODE. ANN. § 160.706 (West 2011); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-158 (2011); WASH. REV. CODE
26.26.725 (2011).
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embryos, the former spouse will not be considered the legal parent of
any subsequently resulting child, unless the former spouse consented
in writing to be a parent of a child if the assisted reproduction
occurred after marital dissolution.149

If the couple divorces prior to the placement or implantation of embryos,
the non-genetic parent would not be considered the legal parent of any
resulting child.150
In addition to the legislature, courts have also dealt with the
distinction between frozen embryos and implanted embryos.151 For
example, in In re Baby S, the husband and wife contracted with a surrogate
to carry a child created with the husband’s sperm and a donor egg.152
During the pregnancy, the wife separated from the husband and indicated
her intent to file for divorce.153 The surrogate filed a petition declaring that
the husband and wife were the legal parents while the wife sought to
invalidate the surrogate contract, and thus be relieved of her status as the
legal mother.154 Because the surrogate contract identified both parties as
the “intended parents,” and because all of the wife’s actions leading up to
and after the embryo was implanted were ones of an intended parent, the
court found that “[the baby] would not have been born but for [the wife’s]
actions and express agreement to be the child’s legal mother.”155 Had this
separation of the couple taken place prior to implantation of the embryo,
there would have been no issue regarding parentage because there would
be no baby. Once an embryo has been implanted and the female carrier is
confirmed as pregnant, then there will be a child in nine months.
Implanting the embryo so it may develop into a child is the additional step
that is necessary for intentionality; at that point, but for the actions of the
intended parents, the child would not exist. The same cannot be said of a
frozen embryo. Additionally, most courts have not found that an embryo
constitutes a child, but instead a kind of “special property”;156 thus there
can be no “parents.”157 Therefore, the argument that the non-biological
spouse in a sole-progenitor dispute has a claim to the embryo arising out
of parental intentionality is moot because there is not yet a child.
149. Deborah L. Forman, Embryo Disposition and Divorce: Why Clinic Consent Forms Are Not
the Answer, 24 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 57, 92 (2011).
150. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.725 (2011); see also statutes discussed supra note 148.
151. See In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 282 (1998); In re Baby S., 128 A.3d
296, 298 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2015).
152. Baby S., 128 A.3d at 298.
153. Id. at 300–01.
154. See id. at 301.
155. Id. at 306.
156. See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 594 (Tenn. 1992).
157. “Parent” is defined as “[t]he lawful father or mother of someone.” Parent, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
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Further, courts have found that intentionality is only a tiebreaker
when there is a conflict between other valid forms of maternity or
paternity, such as gestational and genetic.158 The court in Johnson v.
Calvert recognized that intentionality is used as a means to select one
parent when there are two valid competing legal claims.159 As such, if a
court were deliberating between a genetic parent and an intentional parent,
the genetic parent would have the stronger claim under Johnson.160 The
court there recognized that a genetic link or presumption is greater than an
argument for intentionality.161
There is no better framework that adequately protects the interests of
genetic progenitors. This framework would help courts in sole-progenitor
disputes by creating a more bright line rule that would not only give courts
more guidance in resolving these disputes but also allow people
considering IVF a clearer understanding of what will happen to their
embryos if the couple divorces. Under this proposal, the genetic progenitor
is always given the sole right of ownership and control over the embryos,
even if a contract says differently. This right may only transfer to the
non-genetic party if the sole progenitor relinquishes rights and essentially
donates the embryos to the other party. Otherwise, the sole-genetic
progenitor may do whatever he or she wishes with the embryos, regardless
of the wishes of the other party. By placing absolute ownership in the
hands of the genetic progenitor, courts would guarantee that public policy
would never be violated by authorizing forced procreation.
CONCLUSION
As the current analytical frameworks being utilized by courts in
dual-progenitor, frozen-embryo disputes do not adequately address the
concerns present in sole-progenitor disputes, a new framework is
necessary for these sole-genetic progenitor situations. This Note advocates
for courts to implement a framework that grants the sole genetic progenitor
absolute rights of ownership over the frozen embryos, as the
non-genetically related spouse has no sufficient available ownership
theory upon which to claim legal rights over the embryos.
This proposed framework would create a more efficient solution for
settling sole-progenitor disputes. As IVF continues to become more
prevalent and less expensive, and as couples continue to put off
childbearing until later in life, situations such as these are likely to arise
more frequently. Courts should not be limited to the three original
158. Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 782 (Cal. 1993).
159. See id.
160. See id.
161. See id.
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frameworks (contemporaneous mutual assent, balancing, and contractual),
but should instead take the time to delve into the rights of each party under
the circumstances.
While some legislatures have attempted to aid in the resolution of
these issues by enacting statutes that clarify that if a couple divorces prior
to any implantation of embryos, the non-biological parent will not be
considered a legal parent of any resulting children, this is only one step
toward widespread clarity.162 Other states should follow suit and enact a
statute that would accomplish this goal of preventing a non-genetically
related spouse from laying claim to embryos in a divorce. Alternatively, a
uniform code or addition to the UPA would be helpful to create
consistency among the states and give more guidance to courts and couples
considering IVF. As the body of assisted reproductive technology law
continues to grow, either state legislatures or courts will have to respond
to these new technologies in order to protect societal interests.

162. See generally Forman, supra note 149.

